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Andrew Sneddon's Autonomy seeks to
explore the nature of autonomy with a
focus on the psychological capacities that
most humans develop through during their
lives and the role they play in our lives.
The book is divided into eight chapters,
with the early chapters devoted to offering
a robust account of autonomy, while the
latter chapters are focused on the value of
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autonomy.
The first chapter is an introduction
to autonomy. The next two chapters offer
a partial account of the autonomy of
persons. Chapter four explores theories in
psychology that might undermine this
theory of autonomy. Chapter five argues
that autonomy is both instrumentally and
intrinsically valuable. Chapters six and
seven explore the relationship between
personal autonomy and paternalism and
political autonomy. Finally, in chapter
eight the author argues that autonomy is
omnirelevant.
Whether the author has made a
substantial contribution to the philosophical
discussion of autonomy stands or falls on
the account of autonomy he presents in the
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first chapter. Here Sneddon distinguishes
between four types of control: (i) autonomy, or selfrule; (ii) heteronomy, or rule
by others; (iii) cosmonomy, or rule by nonpersons; and (iv) oudenonomy, or rule
http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=7250&cn=394
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by nothing.
Oddly, the author contends that one can "embrace heteronomy", suggesting
that slavery  whether entered freely, or by force  constitutes heteronomy;
however it strikes me that this is a mistake. (9) While some slaves may have their
wills broken and become heteronomous, it strikes me that most slaves are
autonomous in the relevant sense, even if they choose to follow the commands of
others as a means to avoid retribution for disobedience.
According to Sneddon, an agent is cosmonomous if her actions are causally
determined by her environment. He asks us to picture a frog that has been
causally determined to stick its tongue out whenever it spots a fly. However, this
account of cosmonomy is equally applicable to the standard compatibilist account of
human action, where compatibilists believe that moral responsibility is compatible
with determinism. If the theory of universal causal determinism is true, then
everything is completely causally determined by the laws of nature and the actual
past, our actions would not be autonomous, but cosmonomous. Thus, it seems, the
author's account of autonomy is inconsistent with compatibilist theories of agency.
The author's distinction between heteronomy and cosmonomy is
instrumentally valuable in some sense, however in both cases the agent's choices
are being causally determined by external forces. For the Pavlovianly conditioned
slave, they are caused to act by the fear of their master's whip; for the frog they
are caused to act by the sight of a fly passing by.
Lastly, for the author, an agent's choice would be oudenonomous if she
acted on whim alone. While this account might be compelling, it would not be
difficult to offer a deterministic account of human whims such that oudenonomy
would be reducible to cosmonomy. A better example of oudenonomy would be
whatincompatibilist philosopher Robert Kane calls a selfforming action. According
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to Kane moral agency requires at least partial indeterminism, but that our
psychological processes are mostly deterministic. However, in some special
scenarios he contends that human beings can make undetermined, inherently
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arbitrary, choices  selfforming actions
 actions that we are later causally
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determined to embrace as part of our self or distance ourselves from. The author's Reviews
account of autonomy is inconsistent with Kane's model of indeterminism.
If this analysis is correct, autonomy on the author's view is neither
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compatible with universal causal determinism or arbitrary indeterminism;
autonomy require nonarbitrary indeterminism, perhaps consistent with what some
incompatibilists call agent control.
A systematic shortcoming in this work is that the author fails to use
technical language, or refer the large body of literature concerning autonomy, with
almost no mention of the robust metaphysical debate at the heart of academic
literature on autonomy. The author's account of autonomy is woefully imprecise
and underdeveloped.
The best example of this incompleteness comes later in the first chapter,
when the author seeks to distinguish autonomy from things it is not. Autonomy is
distinct from political autonomy, authenticity, moral autonomy, and moral
responsibility, the author contends. Moral philosophers tend to agree to that moral
agencyrequires the ability to be morally responsible for one's free actions.
http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=7250&cn=394
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According to most ethicists, it makes sense to hold someone morally responsible
for her actions if and if her actions are up to her. But this just is to say that moral
agency requires selfcontrol, or autonomy!
Sneddon admits that most autonomous agents are moral agents; however
he contends that "It is conceivable... to think of people who are capable of running
their lives but who are, in one way or another, not morally responsible agents." (6)
It is not clear what the author means here  one possibility is that the author means
that some autonomous moral agents contingently might not be morally responsible
for anything  for example, if I were to clone myself and copy and paste my
memories into that clone, but never wake that clone from its artificial coma, then
the clone would be a (potential) moral agent that is contingently not morally
responsible for anything. However, this does not appear to be the highly technical
point the author is making. He continues, "Some psychopaths might be like this.
Depending on the psychological details of their psychopathy, they might be
sufficiently insensible to moral standards as to be unfit for assessment in those
terms." This strikes me as absurd!
There is somewhat of a caricature of psychopaths in contemporary literature
as amoral autonomous agents who are, for whatever reason, incapable of
understanding moral concepts. One popular account is that psychopaths lack
empathy, or the ability to mirror the emotions of other people. Normal people, the
story goes, don't senselessly harm others because when they see others in pain it
makes them feel bad; psychopaths without empathy, however, would have no such
deterrent. However, this psychopath still has access to plenty of moral cues!
Remember that for Sneddon, to act arbitrarily is to act oudenonomously, not
autonomously. So by stipulation, the autonomous agent acts for reasons! In James
Rachels' excellent introduction to ethics, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, he
presents what he calls the minimum conception of morality; roughly the right thing
to do is the thing that one has the best reasons to do, while giving equal weight to
the interests of all those involved. Sneddon might believe that these psychopaths,
because of their lack of empathy, lack the ability to act morally  but not so! The
psychopath has different reasons to act (by stipulation, he cannot feel empathy for
others), but he still has reasons, and the right thing to do is what one has the best
reasons to do!

Setting aside practical reasons for moral behavior, in order for the

psychopath to run their lives they must have the ability to interact with other
human beings, about whom they have to have the ability to ascribe interests to,
and emotional states. Some neuroatypical persons might be utterly unaware of
another's emotional state and thus can't be expected to react as a neurotypical
person would, but this is not to say that they have equal reason to pat them on the
back as they do to stab them with a knife! Empathy is, no doubt, a useful tool, but
it neither necessary nor sufficient for moral agency or moral responsibility. A
psychopath might be differently morally responsible, but if they are autonomous
agents, then by stipulation they must have the capacity to act for reasons, and can
be judged morally in virtue of their actions.
Unfortunately Sneddon takes himself to have successfully divorced
autonomy from moral agency. The rest of the book scarcely mentions the one topic
that most philosophers and laymen interested in autonomy are concerned with, and
http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=7250&cn=394

3/4

11/25/2015

Review  Autonomy  Philosophy

what is left is written in ambiguously without the rigor or attention to detail one
expects from contemporary philosophy.
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